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Zoning
By ROBIN GRIFFIN* AND FRANK BECKER**
INTRODUCTION
In 1966 the Kentucky General Assembly enacted, for the
first time, uniform legislation for land use planning and zoning,
completely revising Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) chapter
100.1 For the most part, the involvement of the Kentucky Leg-
islature with planning and zoning ended at this point; very
little legislation has succeeded the 1966 revision. On the other
hand, Kentucky courts have always been active in the area of
zoning and planning, and this activity did not cease after the
1966 revision of chapter 100.2 The Kentucky appellate courts
have been extremely active during the last decade in the area
of zoning and planning, substantially clarifying and compli-
menting the zoning statutes enacted by the Legislature in 1966.
This article focuses on the decisions of the Kentucky appellate
courts in the area of zoning during the last decade, in light of
the statutory backdrop created by the 1966 revision of chapter
100 and subsequent amendments. The initial sections of the
article (Sections I, II and III) deal primarily with procedural
issues and available remedies, while the remainder of the arti-
cle examines judicial treatment of substantive problems under
the statute.
I. LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
A. The 1966 Legislation
KRS chapter 100, as revised by the 1966 Kentucky General
Assembly, is basically enabling legislation; the legislation as a
whole does not "plan and zone" the State, but enables local
* Partner in the firm of Miller, Griffin & Marks, Lexington, Kentucky. J.D. 1951,
University of Kentucky.
** J.D. 1979, University of Kentucky College of Law.
1966 Ky. Acts, ch. 172.
2 For an analysis of many of these Kentucky cases see generally E. C. YoKMY,
ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as E. C. YoKLEY]. For a
comprehensive review of recent national developments in zoning law see 91 HARv. L.
Rgv. 1427-1708 (1978).
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governments, if they desire, to institute their own planning and
zoning. Once planning and zoning is initiated, however, the
local authorities are required to follow the basic procedural
scheme described in the Act. The provisions of the Act are
outlined in detail by Professor Tarlock,3 and only a short sum-
mary need be presented here.
The first step in the process of local zoning is the creation
of functional planning units. Section 100.113 permits local gov-
ernments to form one of three types of planning units: (1) inde-
pendent planning units, which a city or cities form without the
cooperation of the surrounding county,4 (2) joint planning
units, which the cities and encompassing county form in coop-
eration with each other,5 (3) regional planning units, which two
or more adjacent planning units voluntarily agree to form.'
Additionally, section 100.131 gives the independent city plan-
ning unit power to exercise planning and zoning control up to
five miles outside its corporate limits, but within the surround-
ing county.
7
Before a planning unit can engage in planning and zoning,
the local government(s) involved must establish a planning
commission consisting of five to fifteen members.8 Qualifica-
tions and appointment of commission members,9 terms of of-
fice,'" removal of members, 1 election of officers,'2 and conduct
of meetings13 are all governed by various provisions contained
in chapter 100. The planning commission is responsible for
preparing a comprehensive plan,'4 in compliance with statutory
Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An
Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).
'KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES § 100.117 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
KRS § 100.121 (1971).
KRS § 100.123 (1971). A major deficiency of the legislation, according to Tar-
lock, was the failure to provide for interstate regional planning. Tarlock, supra note 3,
at 565.
See Tarlock, supra note 3, at 567-72, for a discussion of "extraterritorial land use
controls" permitted by the Act, and their constitutional ramifications.
KRS § 100.133 (1971).
KRS §§ 100.133-.141 (1971).
,6 KRS §§ 100.143-.147 (1971).
, KRS § 100.157 (1971).
12 KRS § 100.161 (1971).
'1 KRS § 100.163 (1971) (number of meetings); KRS § 100.167 (Supp. 1978) (min-
utes and by-laws); KRS § 100.171 (1971) (quorum rules).
" KRS § 100.191 (1971).
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specifications. 5 This comprehensive plan may then be adopted
by the planning commission after a public hearing. 6
The Act authorizes cities and counties within planning
units to zone by means of textual and map ordinances after
they adopt the objectives of the comprehensive plan, and also
prescribes the procedure for the preparation and enactment of
the ordinances." Additional provisions deal with the method of
amending the zoning ordinance once the zoning regulations
have been adopted by the local governing body.18 The proposed
amendment is first submitted to the planning commission. The
commission must hold a public hearing and subsequently make
a recommendation to the local governing body, which then
makes the final decision approving or rejecting the change.1 ' As
a prerequisite to approval, either the planning commission or
the legislative body must find that the amendment is in agree-
ment with the comprehensive plan, or, alternatively, (1)
"[t]hat the original zoning classification given to the property
was inappropriate or improper," or (2) "[t]hat there have
been major changes . . . within the area involved which were
not anticipated in the community's comprehensive plan and
which have substantially altered the basic character of such
area."
20
The planning commission also has the power to adopt
"regulations for the subdivision of land,"'21 which must be
based on the comprehensive plan."2 The planning commission
is required to approve subdivision plans before plats designat-
ing the division can be recorded in the county.clerk's office.2
The commission also has the authority to formulate procedures
for the review and approval of subdivision plats.
24
" KRS § 100.187 (1971).
" KRS § 100.197 (1971).
17 KRS §§ 100.201 (1971), 100.203 (Supp. 1978), 100.207 (1971), 100.211 (Supp.
1978).
18 KRS § 100.211 (Supp. 1978).
ir KRS §§ 100.211 (Supp. 1978), 100.321 (1971).
KRS § 100.213 (1971). As enacted in 1966, the provision required both the
planning commission and the local governing body to make the specified findings. See
Tarlock, supra note 3, at 588-89. However, the Kentucky General Assembly made the
appropriate statutory change in 1968. 1968 Ky. Acts, ch. 198, § 1.
21 KRS § 100.273 (1971).
- KRS § 100.281 (1971).
KRS § 100.277 (1971).
24 KRS § 100.281 (1971).
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Non-conforming uses existing at the time of the implemen-
tation of a zoning are permitted to continue, though such uses
may not be expanded or changed into a use under a less restric-
tive classification. 5 Some variances from the literal terms of
the zoning ordinance are permitted, if approved by a board of
adjustment,2" which also is empowered to handle the claims of
any person aggrieved by the enforcement of a zoning regula-
tion, or other official zoning action.- The board of adjustment
may also grant permits allowing uses at variance from the zon-
ing classification of an area, when the zoning ordinance per-
mits such a variance under certain, named circumstances.2
The statute also directs the board of adjustment to review the
enforcement of zoning regulations by administrative officials
when it is alleged that the building inspector erred in his inter-
pretation of the regulations.2"
The conclusion of the statute provides for enforcement of
KRS chapter 199 by providing the planning commission a
cause of action in circuit court for "all appropriate relief in-
cluding injunctions."3 Finally, the statute permits any party
aggrieved by zoning proceedings to appeal- to the circuit court."1
B. Statutory Developments Since 1966
Since 1966, the Kentucky General Assembly has made
only minor modifications in chapter 100. Primarily, these
changes simply clarified the wording of various zoning stat-
utes.3 2 Significantly, however, the legislature has made several
changes which indicate a recognition of the need for orderly
KRS § 100.253 (Supp. 1978).
• KRS § 100.241-.251 (1971).
KRS §§ 100.257-.261 (1971).
KRS § 100.237 (Supp. 1978).
KRS § 100.257 (1971).
KRS 99 100.337, 100.991 (1971).
31 KRS § 100.347 (1971).
12 See, e.g., 1968 Ky. Acts, ch. 198 (clarifying KRS § 100.213 (1971), see note 1
supra for a discussion of this change); 1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 360, § 1 (changing KRS §
100.203 (Supp. 1978) to insulate agricultural purpose land from regulations prohibiting
one mobile home); 1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 360, § 2 (adding a new section to make it clear
that nothing in chapter 100 abrogates local health, safety, and sewage regulations);
1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 398 (amending KRS § 100.111(22) (Supp. 1978) and clarifying the
definition of "subdivision").
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administration of historic preservation zoning. While the 1966
Act recognized the legitimacy of historic preservation zoning,3
the 1972 Legislature enacted the first statute making special
provision for historic district zoning.3 The Legislature
amended section 100.127 to allow planning units to create a
board to advise the zoning administrator on the issuance of
permits in historic districts, thus providing for the orderly
administration of zoning for historic preservation.
3
The 1972, 1976, and 1978 General Assemblies added provi-
sions dealing with public notification of zoning changes. The
1972 Legislature added KRS § 100.212 to require notice by
"posting" of a sign on the land for which the zoning change is
sought. 6 The statute also specifies the size and content of the
notification sign. 3 The 1978 Legislature amended KRS §
100.21131 and added KRS § 100.21431 to require more elaborate
public notice for zoning amendment action in any planning
unit containing a city of the first class. These provisions require
newspaper notices to describe the property in question with
more specificity than previously necessary,"0 and require notifi-
cation of surrounding property owners by mail as well as by
posting. 1 Additionally, KRS § 100.214 provides for the sched-
uling of public hearings at night to allow increased attendance
by the public.42 These changes indicate the increased sensitiv-
ity of the Kentucky Legislature to the need for greater public
participation in the zoning amendment process.
Finally, the 1978 Legislature amended the non-conforming
use provision, section 100.253, to allow the enlargement or ex-
tension of a non-conforming use in certain circumstances."3 If
the non-conforming use is a "major public attraction" which
KRS §§ 100.201 (1971), 100.203(1)(e) (Supp. 1978).
" 1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 323 (codified in KRS § 100.127(3) (Supp. 1978)).
3 Id. See Comment, A Challenge to Historical Preservation in Kentucky, 65 Ky.
L.J. 895 (1977), for a discussion of problems with historic district zoning.
31 1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 233; 1976 Ky. Acts, ch. 66.
KRS § 100.212(1) (Supp. 1978).
4 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 327, § 1(e).
31 Id. at § 2.
0 KRS § 100.211(2) (Supp. 1978).
KRS § 100.214(1), (2), (4) (Supp. 1978).
4 KRS § 100.214(3) (Supp. 1978).
3 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 327, § 3.
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has contributed "substantially to the economy of the com-
munity and state, of which prestige and status the site is an
essential element," the use may be enlarged or extended to
meet increasing demands of participants and patrons. 4 By this
action the Legislature provided for the growth and expansion
of sports arenas and similar attractions.
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. The Due Process Requirement
KRS § § 100.211, 100.213, and 100.321 constitute the statu-
tory scheme for amending a zoning ordinance by changing the
zone classification of a particular piece of land. 5 However, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals" has recognized that mere compli-
ance with the statutory process may be insufficient, since pro-
cedural due process is required in zoning change proceedings
conducted by administrative or legislative bodies."7 City of
Louisville v. McDonald" afforded the Court an opportunity to
delineate procedural due process requirements in the zoning
change context. In McDonald, a Louisville developer at-
tempted to have land rezoned from "R-5", permitting use for
a single family residence, to "R-7", permitting high-density
apartment use. The Zoning Commission held a public hearing
at which the commission heard evidence in favor of the zoning
change, as well as objections to the change from neighbors.
After the hearing, the commission issued findings of fact stat-
4, KRS § 100.253(2) (Supp. 1978).
45 See text accompanying notes 18 to 20 supra for a discussion of these statutory
provisions.
" Prior to 1976 the Kentucky Court of Appeals was the highest state appellate
court in Kentucky. By a constitutional amendment effective January 1, 1976, the
Kentucky Supreme Court was created as the highest state court, and the Kentucky
Court of Appeals became an intermediate court of appeal. Ky. CONST. §§ 109-111.
References to the Court of Appeals in cases decided prior to 1976 will be to the high
court; references to the Court of Appeals in cases following 1975 will be to the interme-
diate court.
41 City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Ky. 1971); Morris v. City
of Catlettsburg, 437 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Ky. 1969). Courts in other jurisdictions have also
recognized this need, and likewise have not hesitated to fill procedural gaps. See
Booth, A Realistic Re-examination of Rezoning Procedure: The Complimentary Re-
quirements of Due Process and Judicial Review, 10 GA. L. Rav. 753, 766 (1976).
" 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971).
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ing that there had been major changes within the area which
were not anticipated in the comprehensive plan; on the basis
of this finding the commission recommended rezoning. The
commission's findings and recommendation were then consid-
ered by the zoning committee of the Board of Aldermen of the
City of Louisville. At the committee meeting, the Chairman of
the committee informed the other members that he had com-
mitted himself to opposing the rezoning. Subsequently, the
Chairman informed the Board of Aldermen that the committee
opposed the rezoning; pursuant to this recommendation, the
aldermen voted unanimously to deny the rezoning." In a de-
claratory judgment action brought by the developer, the circuit
court found that the action of the Board of Aldermen was
arbitrary and directed the rezoning to R-7.11
On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the
principles of procedural due process were applicable to rezon-
ing procedures and went on to consider the nature and extent
of the procedural safeguards mandated by due process in zon-
ing change proceedings." The Court noted that for purposes of
the zoning change process the local governing body was not
making rules of general application, or "legislating," but was
making a decision which affected the property right of an indi-
vidual property-owner, or "adjudicating.""2 Adjudicatory pro-
ceedings require a greater number of procedural due process
safeguards than legislative proceedings, and full consideration
of the evidence and careful fact-finding are essential to the
protection of the rights of property-owners. For these reasons
and because a "record" of the proceedings is necessary for
proper judicial review,5" the Court of Appeals concluded that a
complete adjudicatory hearing was required by procedural due
process in a proceeding to determine whether to rezone a par-
" Id. at 175. The Court noted that the committee chairman had "gone out on a
limb" by committing himself to oppose the rezoning in a discussion with neighbors
opposed to the zoning change application. Id.
, Id. at 176.
" Id. at 177.
', Id. at 178-79. Booth contrasts the characteristics of judicial action with legisla-
tive action and concludes that a specific amendment of a zoning plan should be
considered adjudication. Booth, supra note 47, at 774. Booth's reasoning correlates
with that of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in McDonald.
13 470 S.W.2d at 179. See also Booth, supra note 47, at 779-91.
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ticular piece of property. Failure to provide such a hearing
would invalidate the action of the local governing body by ren-
dering it "arbitrary."54
The Court of Appeals, however, provided an alternative
forum for the hearing. The Court stated that the local authority
could hold the hearing itself, or use findings of fact resulting
from a full adjudicatory hearing conducted by the planning
commission and conveyed to the local authority in the form of
a hearing record." Thus the Court of Appeals indicated that
the key to fulfilling the requirements of procedural due process
is the use of a fair, complete fact-finding procedure, regardless
of which administrative or legislative body makes the determi-
nations of fact."
B. The Application and Refinement of the McDonald Rule
City of Louisville v. McDonald established what Yokley's
treatise on zoning law refers to as the "Kentucky rule. 5 7 A
series of cases following McDonald applied and clarified the
rule, and also emphasized the need for local legislatures to
make findings of adjudicative facts. In neither Montfort v.
Archer,5" nor Hays v. City of Winchester,59 had the local legisla-
ture held an evidentiary-type hearing or made findings of adju-
dicative facts. In both cases the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that the failure to make findings of adjudicative facts,
based on either a hearing conducted by the legislature or the
record from a planning commission hearing, constituted arbi-
trary action.10 However, in Edlin v. Fiscal Court,"1 the Court
' 470 S.W.2d at 177-78.
Id. at 179. The Court of Appeals made this explicitly clear in Montfort v.
Archer, 477 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Ky. 1971), which was decided shortly after McDonald.
But note that the record "must adequately reflect the elements necessary for judicial
review to determine whether the ultimate action was arbitrary." 470 S.W.2d at 179.
59 Not every jurisdiction requires a trial-type hearing by the equivalent of the
planning commission. See, e.g., Gulf and Eastern Development Corp. v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 30 LAND UsE LAW AND ZONING DIGEsT 218 (Fla. 1978) (holding that proce-
dural due process protections of the landowner do not apply to the fact-finding proce-
dures of recommending bodies).
" 2 E. C. YOKLEY, supra note 2, at § 11-12, at 186.
477 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. 1971).
5, 495 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1973).
11 Id. at 769; 477 S.W.2d at 145.
61 497 S.W.2d 229 (Ky. 1973).
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found compliance with procedural due process when the city
legislature made findings of fact based on the record from the
complete adjudicatory hearing conducted by the planning
commission."6
In Caller v. Ison63 and Hines v. Pinchback-Halloran Volk-
swagen, Inc." the Kentucky Court of Appeals explained the
meaning and purpose of the "findings of fact" requirement. In
Caller, the planning commission opposed a change in zoning
from professional to neighborhood business use. The local legis-
lature, rejecting the commission's recommendation, permitted
the zoning change and made "factual findings" which simply
duplicated the wording of KRS § 100.213(2) .5 In Hines the
local legislature held a public hearing, granted the proposed
zoning change, and made findings of fact that the proposed
zoning was "'in agreement with the community's Compre-
hensive Plan (land use).' " In both cases the Court of Appeals
held that the findings of fact were insufficient. 7 The Court
stated that findings of fact must be specific, more than merely
conclusory," and may not simply parrot the wording of the
statute. 9 Specificity is essential to fulfill the primary purpose
for the findings of fact requirement by providing a basis for
judicial review."0 In the eyes of the Court, informed judicial
review is an integral element of due process in zoning change
procedures .
7,
The Court of Appeals also imposed procedural due process
limitations on the conduct of a local legislative body which
42 Id. at 230. Edlin represents a situation where the local legislature could conduct
a non-trial-type hearing yet not violate due process. The Court indicated that where
the record of the planning commission supports the findings of the local legislature,
the procedures followed by the local legislature need not be examined. Id.
'3 508 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1974).
" 513 S.W.2d 492 (Ky. 1974).
,1 508 S.W.2d at 776. See text accompanying note 20 supra for the text of KRS §
100.213(2) (1971).
" 513 S.W.2d at 493.
, Id.; 508 S.W.2d at 776-77. In Hines, the Court decided the case on other
grounds. See text accompanying notes 117-19 infra.
" 508 S.W.2d at 777.
' Id. at 776.
o Id. at 777.
7, Id. In order to facilitate judicial review, findings of fact by administrative agen-
cies are required by virtually all federal and state courts. See 2 K. DAvis, ADMINSTRA-
TIE LAw TREATSE § 16.05 (1958).
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makes zoning change determinations based on the record of a
planning commission hearing, rather than on a de novo adjudi-
catory hearing conducted by the local legislative body itself. In
Resource Development Corp. v. Campbell County Fiscal
Court,"2 the Court considered an appeal by an applicant denied
a zoning change by the local fiscal court. The fiscal court had
conducted no hearing of its own, relying instead on the record
of the planning commission's hearing. However, the individual
members of the fiscal court also considered numerous letters
protesting the proposed change which they had received after
the planning commission's hearing. Contrary to the recommen-
dations of the planning commission, and apparently persuaded
by the protest letters, the fiscal court denied the change." The
Court of Appeals held that the letters could not be considered,
except in the context of an adjudicatory hearing." The local
legislature, if it decides not to hold a hearing, must confine
itself exclusively to the record of the planning commission's
hearing; absolutely no extrinsic evidence can be considered.
75
Consideration of any evidence other than the planning com-
mission record, except in the context of a second, complete
adjudicatory hearing, violates the requirements of procedural
due process by allowing the fiscal court to base its decision, at
least in part, on evidence which has not been tested by cross-
examination or any other safeguards of an adjudicatory pro-
ceeding.76
Procedural due process imposes certain affirmative re-
quirements on the local legislature, as well as prohibiting the
consideration of extrinsic evidence. In McKinstry v. Wells,77
the planning commission both approved the applicant's re-
quested zoning change and adopted extensive findings of fact
after conducting an adjudicatory hearing. The local fiscal
court, choosing not to conduct its own hearing while refraining
from considering extrinsic evidence, summarily denied the zon-
ing change. The Court of Appeals held that the due process
72 543 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1976).
73 Id. at 227.
74 Id.
73 Id.
71 Id. at 228.
548 S.W.2d 169 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
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requirements enumerated in McDonald had been violated,
even though the fiscal court had complied with the principles
of Resource Development. If the fiscal court does not conduct
its own hearing, but declines to adopt the planning commis-
sion's recommendations and findings of fact, it must use the
record of the planning commission's hearing to prepare its own
findings of fact to support its decision. Because the fiscal court
in McKinstry had not made any findings of fact to support its
departure from the recommendation of the planning commis-
sion, it had violated the applicant's procedural due process
rights.7"
In the course of its opinion in McKinstry, the Court of
Appeals clarified the "findings of fact" requirement while deal-
ing with the fiscal court's contention that the comprehensive
plan constituted "findings of fact." The court distinguished
findings of legislative facts from findings of adjudicative facts,
and stated that the comprehensive plan is based on a finding
of legislative facts. Because McDonald requires zoning amend-
ment decisions to be based on findings of adjudicative facts in
order to satisfy due process, the comprehensive plan cannot
constitute the "findings of fact" required to sustain a zoning
amendment decision by a local legislative body. 9
While the McKinstry court detailed the "findings of fact"
requirement, the Court of Appeals explained the meaning of
the adjudicatory hearing requirement in Fiscal Court v.
Ogden.8" The Jefferson County Fiscal Court, after holding a
public hearing, granted a rezoning request by a residential de-
veloper who wished to develop farm land. Opponents of the
development contended that the hearing was not "trial-like"
and therefore did not comply with procedural due process re-
quirements. The Fiscal Court conducted an informal hearing
rather than a formal courtroom trial and did not provide for the
swearing and cross-examination of witnesses. The Court of
Appeals found no due process violation in such an approach
and, in fact, expressed a preference for such an informal pro-
ceeding, since it provides a less intimidating atmosphere in
which the public can express its views. Due process in the
71 Id. at 172-73.
Id. at 173-74.
" 556 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
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adjudicatory hearing requires that all parties have a substan-
tial opportunity to express their opinions and to protest, not
that substantial protest always prevails.8'
C. The Remedy for Procedural Due Process Violations
In both City of Louisville v. McDonald and McKinstry v.
Wells, the circuit courts determined that the procedures em-
ployed by the local legislative bodies violated due process and
directed rezoning of the property in question." Although the
Kentucky Court of Appeals also found a due process violation,
it did not find that directing the rezoning of the property was
an appropriate remedy. 3 The court stated that the circuit
courts have no authority to conduct de novo trials to determine
whether the zoning change should be granted,8" or to direct that
the local legislature exercise its discretion in any particular
way." Instead, the circuit court must simply direct the fiscal
court to "make the findings of adjudicative facts necessary for
judicial review." 8
III. JuDIcIAL REVIEW
A. The Scope of Judicial Review.
Even prior to the enactment of Kentucky's zoning statute
in 1966, the Kentucky Court of Appeals had emphasized the
limited scope of judicial review of zoning amendment deci-
sions. 7 In 1970, the Court summarized the scope of judicial
,Id. at 900-01.
" McKinstry v. Wells, 548 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); City of Louisville
v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 179 (Ky. 1971).
548 S.W.2d at 174; 470 S.W.2d at 179.
" Id.
548 S.W.2d at 174.
Id. One exception to this is Hines v. Pinchback-Halloran Volkswagen, Inc., 513
S.W.2d 492 (Ky. 1974), discussed in text accompanying note 64 supra. The Hines case
shows a failure of the Court of Appeals to clearly segregate procedural due process
review from substantive review. Although the local legislature violated procedural due
process by insufficiently articulating the findings of fact, the Court of Appeals re-
manded the case for consideration of whether the evidence supported the decision. Id.
at 494-95. Apparently a failure to articulate findings of fact in this case was not
considered a serious enough procedural due process violation to warrant refusal to
consider the substantive issue involved in the case.
"American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and
Zoning Comm'n, 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964).
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review as follows:
[T]he scope of judicial review of zoning action taken by
public bodies, both administrative and legislative, is limited
to determining whether the action was arbitrary, which ordi-
narily involves these considerations: (1) whether the action
under attack was in excess of the powers granted to the public
bodies (2) whether the parties were deprived of procedural
due process by the public bodies (3) whether there is a lack
of evidentiary support for the findings of the public bodies."
The previous section of this article discussed the second of
these scope considerations-this section will discuss cases in-
volving the first and third questions.
It should be noted, however, that the Kentucky courts
have not always carefully indicated which of the above three
considerations was dispositive in a particular case. The confu-
sion particularly results from the broad meaning given the term
"arbitrary" by the courts. The term is used to indicate that the
local bodies have either acted outside the scope of their
statutorily-granted powers,89 failed to satisfy procedural due
process," or made a rezoning decision without sufficient evi-
dentiary support." In other words, "arbitrary" is a conclusory
term used by the courts to characterize an insufficiency of the
zoning decision piocess in any of the three categories of judicial
review.
B. Judicial Review of Compliance with Chapter 100
The determination of whether a local legislative or admin-
istrative zoning body has acted within the scope of its
statutorily-granted powers is essentially a question of whether
the local body has complied with KRS chapter 100. Thus the
courts must often decide the precise meaning of various provi-
sions of chapter 100. Two recent cases provide examples of
judicial interpretation, and indicate that failure to comply with
the procedural requirements of the enabling legislation may
M Fallon v. Baker, 455 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Ky. 1970). In formulating these criteria,
the Court relied heavily on the discussion of the bases for judicial review in American
Beauty, 379 S.W.2d at 456.
" See, e.g., Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Ky. 1977).
" See, e.g., City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Ky. 1971).
" See, e.g., Wells v. Fiscal Court, 457 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Ky 1970).
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invalidate any zoning decisions of the local government.
In City of Erlanger v. Hoff,9" the City of Erlanger had
failed to re-enact a comprehensive plan on which to base its
zoning decisions. The city had adopted a comprehensive plan
and zoning ordinance prior to the 1966 legislation enacting
KRS chapter 100, but KRS § 100.367 provided that all prior
comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances not in conformity
with chapter 100 would cease to be effective in five years."
Thus, in 1971, the City of Erlanger did not have a viable com-
prehensive plan or zoning ordinance, so that the city council's
denial of an application for a zoning change was unfounded and
arbitrary."
Likewise, in Daviess County v. Snyder,5 the Kentucky
Supreme Court found that the denial of a rezoning application
by the Daviess County Fiscal Court and Planning Commission
was arbitrary, because the local government had failed to enact
a valid zoning ordinance. The Daviess County ordinance was
invalid because the Fiscal Court had failed to adopt the
"statement of goals and objectives, principles, policies, and
standards"" of the comprehensive plan prepared by the Plan-
ning Commission, as required by KRS § 100.193.17 This failure
rendered the entire zoning ordinance invalid because KRS § §
100.201 and 100.207 authorize the local legislature to adopt
zoning regulations only after such a statement and objectives
are adopted. 8 The resulting lack of a valid zoning ordinance
left the Fiscal Court without authority to zone or rezone.
C. Substantive Judicial Review of Rezoning Decisions
Because KRS § 100.213 governs the three alternative find-
ings that must be made by the planning commission or local
22 535 S.W.2d 86 (Ky. Ct. App. 1976).
Id. at 87-88.
Id. at 88.
, 556 S.W.2d 688 (Ky. 1977).
16 KRS § 100.193 (1971).
556 S.W.2d at 690.
"Id.
"Id. at 691. The Kentucky Supreme Court also explained that the interim zoning
regulation, KRS § 100.334(2) (1971), did not "save" the county's zoning ordinance
because even interim zoning ordinances remain subject to the qualifications of KRS
§§ 100.201 and 100.207. Id.
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legislature requisite to implementing a zoning amendment,' ®
it also provides a framework for substantive judicial review.
However, the Court of Appeals has also established two other
areas for substantive review: (1) the amount of factual evidence
which local administrative or legislative bodies must produce
to support their decisions; and (2) the extent of the role which
the comprehensive plan should play in judicially determining
whiether a particular rezoning decision was arbitrary. Of
course, a meaningful record for review ' and a comprehensive
plan are prerequisites to any consideration of arbitrariness of
zoning action-without these prerequisites the courts need not
even consider the substantive criteria enumerated above.02
The Court of Appeals has decided that a circuit court may
engage only in limited review of the actions of local administra-
tive or legislative bodies. In the 1970 case of Taylor v. Coblin,0 3
the Court stated that it was not the province of the courts to
try zoning amendment cases de novo; I 4 rather, the courts must
limit themselves to the determination of whether there is "any
substantial evidence to support the action of the administra-
tive agency. ... "I The Court then proceeded to examine the
evidence and found that the planning commission had recom-
mended a denial of the zoning change based on "emotional,
unfounded and frivolous" protest testimony.0 6 The Court,
therefore, interpreted the "any substantial evidence" test to
mean that the evidence supporting the zoning decision must be
credible and indeed substantial.
The concept of limited judicial review of zoning decisions
became more concrete three years after Coblin in City of Louis-
' See text accompanying note 20 supra for the relevant language of KRS §
100.213 (1971).
"I Dorger v. Shoettker, 471 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Ky. 1971).
11 City of Erlanger v. Hoff, 535 S.W.2d 86 (Ky. 1976). See text accompanying
notes 92 to 94 supra for a discussion of the need for a comprehensive plan.
1- 461 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1970). The Court based its opinion in Coblin on the princi-
ples established in American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County
Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964).
I0 461 S.W.2d 78, 79 (Ky. 1970). The Court once again relied onAmerican Beauty,
finding that a de novo trial violated § 27 of the Kentucky Constitution.
10 Id. at 80. The "substantial evidence rule" is the dominant tendency in both
state and federal courts regarding the scope of judicial review of administrative action.
4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA SE § 29.01 (1958).
10 461 S.W.2d at 79.
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viUle v. Kavanaugh.'7 In Kavanaugh, the Louisville aldermen,
after conducting a public hearing, refused to grant a requested
zoning change.' 8 The applicant sued in circuit court for review
of the decision, and the circuit court invalidated the action as
arbitrary.' 9 On appeal, the city contended that the circuit
court, in effect, conducted a de novo trial in violation of the
limited judicial review principle."' The Court of Appeals re-
jected this contention since the circuit court had considered
only the records of the proceedings before the planning com-
mission and the legislative body, and had limited its inquiry
to whether the evidence demonstrated a compelling need for
rezoning.' Thus the Court of Appeals limited the scope of
review by imposing two requirements on the circuit court: (1)
the court must confine itself to the record made before the
zoning authorities,"2 and (2) circuit court inquiry as to whether
there was substantial evidence to support a refusal to imple-
ment a zoning change is limited to a determination of
"'whether or not the evidence shows a compelling need for
the rezoning sought or clearly demonstrates that the existing
zoning classification is no longer appropriate.' "13
Kavanaugh illustrates that the comprehensive plan plays
a crucial role in determining whether a zoning change has been
arbitrarily denied in the face of a compelling need for rezoning.
In Kavanaugh the applicant had requested a change from R-5
(residential) to R-7 (high density apartment). The planning
commission instead recommended a change to R-6 (low density
apartment). Because there was no evidence to support the R-5
zoning and because the comprehensive plan called for R-6 zon-
ing of the area,' the Court of Appeals held the Board of Alder-
men had arbitrarily refused to grant a change to R-6, finding
1-o 495 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1973).
103 Id. at 504.
10, Id.
110 Id.
'Id. at 505.
,,2 Although this requirement was implied in the opinion, it was first explicitly
stated in Fiscal Court v. Stallings, 515 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Ky. 1974).
",3 495 S.W.2d at 505, quoting City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173,
179 (Ky. 1971). The "compelling need" test was first stated in McDonald but was
irrelevant to the disposition of that case.
114 Id.
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that the record "conclusively demonstrated that the existing
zoning classification was not appropriate. 115 Although the
comprehensive plan provided the primary support for finding
a compelling need in Kavanaugh, the Court cautioned that the
plan "is a guide rather than a straightjacket." '
In Hines v. Pinchback-Halloran Volkswagen, Inc.,"7 the
Court of Appeals again considered the importance of the com-
prehensive plan in determining whether a zoning change deci-
sion was arbitrary. In Hinesthe case was remanded to the cir-
cuit court because the land use plan was omitted from the
record for review both at the circuit court and the appellate
levels, even though there was uncontradicted oral testimony as
to its contents."' The circuit court was directed to determine
whether the land use plan justified the decision of the local
legislature and to set the decision aside if the comprehensive
plan did not justify the decision.1 9 Thus Hines, like
Kavanaugh, shows the importance of the comprehensive plan
in the determination of whether the local legislature acted arbi-
trarily.
Despite the supposedly limited scope of judicial review of
zoning decisions by local governing bodies, the Court of Ap-
peals has engaged in broad review of the sufficiency of evidence
behind zoning decisions. In Fiscal Court v. Stallings, 120 the ap-
plicant desired a change from a residential (R-4) to a commer-
cial (C-1) and apartment (R-7) designation, but was denied the
change by the local fiscal court after a hearing. The Court of
Appeals, after finding that the circuit court's review was im-
proper because it failed to confime itself to the record of the
fiscal court," reviewed the record and found that it did not
clearly demonstrate a compelling need for rezoning or that the
existing classification was no longer appropriate.12 The court
113 Id.
"I Id., citing Ward v. Knippenberg, 416 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1967). See Tarlock,
supra note 3, at 590-97, for a discussion of the comprehensive plan as a standard for
judicial review.
17 513 S.W.2d 492 (Ky. 1974).
uS Id. at 494-95.
"' Id. at 495.
J' 515 S.W.2d 234 (Ky. 1974).
121 Id. at 236.
'2 Id. at 236-37.
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supported its conclusion by noting that approximately eleven
individuals had submitted evidence revealing the inappropri-
ateness of the zoning change.' m
A similar result was reached in City of Bowling Green v.
Hunt. "I After the circuit court reviewed the record and decision
of the city legislature, concluding that the refusal to rezone was
arbitrary, the Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the
evidence did not show a compelling need to rezone.'2 The evi-
dence in favor of rezoning from residential to commercial use
consisted of adjacency to property which had been zoned com-
mercial. This evidence standing alone was insufficient to jus-
tify disturbing the decision of the local governing body. 12 Hunt
and Stallings indicate, therefore, that the courts require more
than simply "persuasive" evidence of a compelling need for
rezoning.
In contrast to Hunt and Stallings, in Manley v. City of
Maysville, 27 zoning granted by the local legislature was chal-
lenged in circuit court. The applicant in Manley had requested
rezoning of a parcel of land from residential use to commercial
use and supported his request with evidence that only three of
the eighty-six structures in the residential area were non-
residential and that the property was two blocks from numer-
ous businesses."2 The Court of Appeals, noting that the non-
residential structures were in existence prior to the implemen-
tation of the zoning regulations, held that this evidence was
inadequate to support the decision to rezone since it did not
show that the original zoning was inappropriate or that the
basic character of the area had been altered. 2' The court found
that the local legislature's attempt at piecemeal zoning vio-
lated the basic spirit of the zoning statutes and was therefore
properly within the scope of judicial review.3 0
In Bryan v. Salmon Corp.,'31 substantive review of the evi-
123 Id. at 236.
U 516 S.W.2d 647 (Ky. 1974).
'' Id. at 647-48.
'2 Id. at 648.
1- 528 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1975).
121 Id. at 727.
' Id. at 728.
13 Id.
131 554 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
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dence relevant to a zoning decision again proved to be determi-
native"' In Bryan, the Court of Appeals decided that proce-
dural due process requirements had been fulfilled, in particular
by the making of findings of fact by the local legislature, thus
distinguishing the case from McKinstry v. Wells,1 3 decided
just a few months earlier. But the court held, as it did in
Kavanaugh, that the evidence did not support the decision of
the local legislature to refuse the requested rezoning, rendering
the decision arbitrary. 3 ' In fact, the court found that many of
the findings of fact were not supported by the evidence at all,
and those that were supported by the evidence did not support
the decision against rezoning."' Although the Court of Appeals
did not articulate what evidence demonstrated a compelling
need for rezoning, the court expressed great dissatisfaction
with local legislative bodies that superficially comply with all
the procedural due process requirements but make decisions in
contravention of the evidence. 3 ' Bryan v. Salmon Corp. and
the substantive review cases which precede it indicate that
although the Court of Appeals is conscious of the limited scope
of judicial review of rezoning decisions, it will not hesitate to
alter decisions of local legislative bodies made without substan-
tial evidence and in contravention of individual rights.
D. The Remedy Following Substantive Judicial Review
As discussed above, the remedy for violation of a proce-
dural due process right is to remand to the local administrative
or legislative body with orders to correct the procedure. 37 In
contrast to this, when a substantive review determines that the
local body acted arbitrarily, the Court of Appeals has allowed
circuit courts to direct zoning changes. In City of Louisville v.
Kavanaugh, 13 for instance, when the circuit court reviewed the
2 Fiscal Court v. Ogden, 556 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), also addresses the
substantive issue. However, the summary nature of the Court's disposition of the case
makes it unsuitable for discussion.
In 548 S.W.2d 169 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). See text accompanying notes 77 to 79
supra for a discussion of McKinstry.
'u 554 S.W.2d at 915.
" Id. at 916.
3 Id.
m See text accompanying notes 85 to 87 supra.
" 495 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1973). See text accompanying notes 107 to 119 for a
discussion of Kavanaugh.
1978-79]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
record and determined that refusal to grant rezoning was arbi-
trary, the court directed that the property be rezoned to a
higher classification since the record clearly indicated that any
change short of rezoning was unsupportable." 9 Similarly, the
circuit court in Bryan v. Salmon Corp. 1I directed the requested
zoning change after finding that the refusal to rezone had been
arbitrary."' In both cases the Court of Appeals upheld the cir-
cuit courts' actions because the records showed a compelling
need for the rezoning.142
Although not truly a case involving the substantive review
of a rezoning decision, Lexington - Fayette County Planning
and Zoning Commission v. Levas 43 deserves mention for its
illustration of another remedial alternative available to the cir-
cuit courts - the prohibitory injunction. In Levas, the zoning
change applicants were lessees of certain land owned by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff had appeared before the planning com-
mission to protest the zoning change because the applicant had
included in the application a plan to dedicate some of the
leased land for public use.144 After the plan was approved in
spite of plaintiff's protests, he sued in circuit court to enjoin
any further action under the plan. The court granted the in-
junction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, since anyone own-
ing less than a fee interest in property cannot make a dedica-
tion of the property.145 Levas therefore demonstrates that, at
least in certain circumstances, a prohibitory injunction is
available as preventive relief even when all administrative
remedies have not been exhausted.
E. Method of Obtaining Judicial Review
KRS § 100.347 provides that a party aggrieved by "any
final action of the planning commission or board of adjust-
City of Louisville v. Kavanaugh, 495 S.W.2d 502,504 (Ky. 1973). The applicant
requested a change to an even higher classification, but the planning commission
recommended a change only to the next higher classification.
1U 554 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). See text accompanying notes 131 to 136
for a discussion of Bryan.
"' 554 S.W.2d at 917.
SId.; 495 S.W.2d at 503-04.
"3504 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1973).
' Id. at 685.
"'Id. at 687.
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ments may appeal from the action" to the appropriate circuit
court. The statutory language provides for judicial review not
only of final action by the planning commission (i.e., plat ap-
provals), but also of action by the board of adjustments, which
has the power to grant or deny conditional use permits and
variances. " ' However, in Lampton v. Fiscal Court, 147 the Court
of Appeals stated that an action contesting a zoning body deci-
sion on grounds of arbitrariness or unreasonableness did not
constitute an appeal under the zoning statutes. In Lampton, an
applicant who had been denied a zoning change sued in circuit
court, contending that the local fiscal court had acted arbitrar-
ily. The circuit court dismissed the complaint because the
plaintiff failed to perfect his appeal as required by the civil
rules.'" The plaintiff alleged that the suit was not an appeal,
but an alternative form of direct attack upon the fiscal court's
decision. The Court of Appeals agreed, stating that such a
direct attack was available and that it was error to have dis-
missed the complaint. The decision was consistent with pre-
vious cases in which the Court held that statutory actions for
review of a zoning decision, alleging that the conduct of a gov-
ernmental body was arbitrary or capricious, are not "appeals"
for purposes of the civil rules."9
KRS § 100.347 provides that judicial review of a zoning
decision must be sought "within thirty (30) days after the final
action of the commission or board." In Musser v. Leon Coal
Processing, 10 the Court of Appeals interpreted the meaning of
this requirement. In Musser, the coal company applied to the
planning commission of the City of Ashland to rezone a tract
of land from light industrial to heavy industrial use. Following
a public hearing the planning commission recommended the
rezoning, which the city legislature granted after another pub-
lic hearing at which no one appeared in opposition.1 More
I See text accompanying notes 26 to 29 supra and Tarlock, supra note 3, at 607-
12, for a discussion of the role of the board of adjustment.
17 508 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1974).
"I Id. The plaintiff failed to comply with Ky. R. Crv. P. 72.01, requiring filing of
a certified copy of the order.
" Pierson Trapp Co. v. Peak, 340 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1960); Hatch v. Fiscal Court,
242 S.W.2d 1018 (Ky. 1951).
' 560 S.W.2d 833 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
MS, Id. at 834.
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than six months later the coal company received building per-
mits to construct a coal loading facility. The appellant then
complained to the board of adjustments and subsequently sued
in circuit court after the board determined that the permits
had been properly issued. The suit, brought almost a year after
the original zoning change, alleged that the rezoning was
granted without an adjudicative hearing and that therefore the
rezoning, as well as the building permit, was void.1 2 The circuit
court denied any relief because the appeal had not been taken
within thirty days after final approval of the rezoning. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that "final action" meant
the passage of the zoning ordinance effectuating the rezoning.13
Consequently, "final action" had occurred long before the issu-
ance of the building permits or the denial of relief to the appel-
lant by the board of adjustment, and the rezoning was incon-
testable under KRS § 100.347 once thirty days had expired
after approval of the planning commission's recommenda-
tion.'
54
Although the Court of Appeals construed "final action" in
its statutory framework, the court may have ignored the impli-
cation of Lampton v. Fiscal Court, that a party can directly
attack zoning proceedings as arbitrary even when the party has
not complied with a statutory provision. The Court of Appeals,
however, classified Musser as a "collateral attack," as opposed
to the "direct attack" in Lampton, and stated that "'[w]here
the time to bring a proceeding to review has expired, the person
aggrieved by the decision cannot secure himself an additional
period by bringing a collateral attack upon the decision
"'55 Thus it appears that the Musser Court failed to deal
with the Lampton principle that a circuit court suit contesting
a zoning decision on grounds of arbitrariness is not necessarily
subject to the statutory limitation on appeal. As a result, con-
siderable confusion remains regarding the precise requirements
for obtaining judicial review."'
152 Id.
1- Id. at 835. The planning commission itself cannot take "final action" because
"recommendations are excluded from the statutory-list of final actions. See Tarlock,
supra note 3 at 624-25.
t Musser v. Leon Coal Processing Co., 560 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
"s Id., quoting A. RATHKOPF, LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 63(3) (4th ed. 1975).
" A distinct problem has arisen with regard to appeals from the circuit court to
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F. Judicial Review: Necessary and Indispensible Parties
As noted above, KRS § 100.347 not only allows appeals
from, and judicial review of, final action by the planning com-
mission, but also provides for appeals from board of adjust-
ment decisions, such as decisions granting variances."' How-
ever, the last sentence of KRS § 100.347 states that:
When an appeal has been filed, the clerk of the circuit court
shall issue a summons to all parties, including the planning
commission in all cases, and shall cause it to be delivered for
service as in any other law action. (Emphasis added).
It seems clear-that in an appeal from a decision of the board of
adjustment, a proper adjudication can be made without joining
the planning commission as a party. However, in Board of
Adjustments v. Flood,"'5 a circuit court dismissed such an ap-
peal for failure to join the planning commission, which was an
indispensable party under the circuit court's interpretation of
KRS § 100.347. The Kentucky Court of Appeals took a differ-
ent view, noting that the statute is unclear because (1) it pro-
vides for appeals from both the planning'commission and the
boards of adjustment, and (2) it does not describe the planning
commission as an indispensible party, but "merely requires the
issuing of a summons by the circuit clerk."'' The court, in
effect, held that only the traditional test for the indispensa-
bility of a party should apply, since the statute should not
logically require a party to join the planning commission when
the party is seeking relief from a decision of the board of adjust-
the Court of Appeals. In Schlaak v. Pearman, No. CA-502-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Sept.
23, 1977), the Court of Appeals was faced with an appeal by aggrieved landowners who
were not parties to the appeal to the circuit court, since that appeal was brought by
the applicant landowner against the city legislature which had denied him a zoning
change. The neighboring landowners, dissatisfied by the circuit court's judgment that
the denial of rezoning by the city legislature was improper, intervened to prosecute the
appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals sustained the intervention,
relying on Ky. R. Civ. P. 24.01 and the fact that the applicant landowner was not
prejudiced by an appeal by neighboring landowners rather than by the city legislature.
I" For a discussion of the role of the board of adjustment, see text accompanying
notes 26 to 27 supra.
" No. 78-SC-69-DG (Ky. Nov. 21, 1978).
"' Flood v. Bd. of Adjustments, No. CA-773-MR, slip opinion at 3-4 (Ky. Ct. App.
July 22, 1977).
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ment, an entirely separate entity. ' Because the traditional
test did not require that the planning commission be joined in
this case, the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court erred
in dismissing the appeal.161
On review, however, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
agreed with the circuit court that an appeal to the circuit court
cannot be sustained without joining the planning commis-
sion." 2 Justice Lukowsky, speaking for a unanimous Court,
simply stated in his brief opinion that "it is as plain as a bill-
board" that the statute required an appeal to the circuit court
be perfected by including the planning commission as a party.
The Supreme Court, unlike the Court of Appeals, found that
application of the traditional test for necessary and indispensa-
ble parties was unnecessary, since the statute had foreclosed
the issue.6 '
However, there are several problems with the Supreme
Court's analysis. First, as the Court of Appeals noted, making
the planning commission a party in every appeal simply does
not make sense. Such an unreasonable application of the stat-
ute exists in the Flood case itself. Second, although the Su-
preme Court indicated that the appealing party must "perfect
that appeal by . . .including the planning commission as a
party,"'' the statute by no means makes it clear that the ap-
I" Id. at 5. The Court of Appeals, quoting Gentry v. Ressner, 437 S.W.2d 756,758-
59 (Ky. 1969), stated the test as follows:
The test is whether there can be a proper adjudication of the controversy on
appeal without the presence of the absent parties; whether the rights and
interests of the absent parties are so inextricably bound up with those of the
present parties that a separate adjudication cannot be made; whether, with-
out the presence of the absent parties, the final decree entered in the circuit
court pursuant to the mandate on the appeal will leave the total case in a
condition "inconsistent with equity and good conscience."
Flood v. Bd. of Adjustments, No. CA-663-MR, slip op. at 3 (Ky. Ct. App. July 22,
1977).
, Id. at 5.
,62 Bd. of Adjustments v. Flood, No. 78-SC-79-DG (Ky. Nov. 21, 1978).
113 Id. at 3. Justice Lukowsky noted that the source of the errant rationale by the
Court of Appeals was an erroneous headnote to a prior published opinion which indi-
cated that the planning commission was not always an indispensable party to an
appeal to the circuit court from the board. Justice Lukowsky adds: "[W]e hasten to
remind both bench and bar that the headnotes are not the work of the court and do
not state its decision." Id.
I4 Id.
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pellant has the responsibility for such inclusion. In fact, the
statute seems to explicitly place the responsibility for inform-
ing the planning commission on the clerk of the circuit court."5
In Flood, then, the Supreme Court's decision in effect punished
the appellant for failing to do what the statute required the
clerk, not the appellant to do. Finally, the requirement that the
planning commission is made a party is simply not "plain as a
billboard." The statute on its face only requires that the plan-
ning commission be issued a summons in all cases. That the
planning commission is to be made a party is only implicit in
the summons requirement.
Perhaps the Court should have inquired into the motiva-
tion of the Legislature for including such a provision, and ac-
cordingly limited the scope of the statute. The motivation of
the Legislature, however, can only be the subject of specula-
tion. The Legislature may have intended that the statute apply
only in an appeal to the circuit court from rezoning action by
the local legislature. The need to join the planning commission
as a party arises in such circumstances because KRS § 100.347,
by its terms, applies only to "final action" by the planning
commission, which according to Musser, 6 is the enactment or
defeat of the rezoning ordinance by the local legislature. How-
ever, now that Flood has clarified the law, no apparent sub-
stantial harm accrues from including the planning commisson
as a party in all cases.
IV. NON-CONFORMING USES
A. Regulation of Non-Conforming Uses
KRS § 100.253 permits, with certain specific exceptions,
continuance, enlargement, or extension of uses existing at the
time of the adoption of a local zoning ordinance which do not
conform with the zone classification.6 ' Furthermore, the stat-
'" "When an appeal has been filed, the clerk of the circuit court shall issue a
summons to all parties. . . ." (emphasis added). KRS § 100.347 (Supp. 1978).
' See text accompanying notes 150 to 156 supra for a discussion of Musser.
6" Non-conforming use provisions are often included as a constitutional safe-
guard. 1 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 1.02(5) (1975) [this is a three
volume set hereinafter cited P. ROHAN]. The Kentucky statute now provides protection
beyond this constitutional minimum by allowing expansion or enlargement of a non-
conforming use. KRS § 100.253 (Supp. 1978).
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ute allows the use to be changed if the new use is in the same
or a more restrictive classification. Because the statute does
not detail the method by which non-conforming uses are to be
regulated by local governments, the Court of Appeals has had
to deal with the following questions: (1) Can local legislation
prohibit the continuance of a non-conforming use after it has
been abandoned, and if so, what constitutes abandonment?",
(2) What standards should be used to determine whether a
particular use was non-conforming at the time of the enact-
ment of the zoning ordinance? (3) Can local zoning ordinances
force the forfeiture or amortization of non-conforming uses?
The Court of Appeals responded to the first question by
allowing local legislatures to terminate non-conforming uses if
the use is abandoned for a sufficient length of time. '69 The
Court has qualified this impliedauthorization of abandonment
provisions by construing the term abandonment to include an
intent to abandon. The intent requirement was imposed on
abandonment provisions prior to the enactment of the 1966
legislation '70 and the Court has continued to require intent fol-
lowing the 1966 legislation. 7 ' Local legislatures may make a
determination of intent to abandon from the objectively ob-
served facts, giving special weight to the period of non-use.
17
As regards the second question, the Court has formulated
at least a few standards for determining whether a particular
piece of property was being used in non-conformity with the
zone at the time the zoning ordinance was enacted. In Perkins
v. Joint City-County Planning Commission,'7 3 the plaintiff had
purchased two contiguous tracts of land, one of which con-
'" Local legislatures quite frequently include abandonment provisions in zoning
ordinances, thus this question has faced a large number of cities. Tarlock, supra note
3, at 604.
"I The Court has decided this question rather indirectly, never invalidating such
provisions, but rather enforcing them on several occasions. Id. See Holloway Ready
Mix Co. v. Montfort, 474 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1968), and Smith v. Howard, 407 S.W.2d
139 (Ky. 1966), for a discussion of cases involving construction of abandonment provi-
sions of zoning ordinances.
III Smith v. Howard, 407 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1966); Attorney General v. Johnson,
355 S.W.2d 305 (Ky. 1962). See Tarlock, supra note 3, at 604, for a discussion of these
cases.
"I Holloway Ready Mix Co. v. Montfort, 474 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1968).
172 Id.
1- 480 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1972).
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tained a motel. At the time of the zoning ordinance enactment,
which essentially imposed an agricultural zoning classification
on all unincorporated property in the county, the plaintiff had
spent $10,000 converting the motel into apartments. He had
also spent $2,000, as well as expended effort in negotiating with
engineers, contractors, and financiers, in converting the second
tract into a mobile home park, though no trailers had yet been
installed."' The Court of Appeals, noting that neither the state
nor local ordinance defined what constituted an existing use, 7'
stated:
The general rule is that for property to qualify as non-
conforming use the use must have been actually demon-
strated prior to the zoning ordinance. Mere contemplation of
use of property for a specific purpose is not sufficient. . .Nor
is the purchase of the property accompanied by an intent to
use it for a specific purpose sufficient.'
Application of this rule in Perkins would have resulted in
the failure of the plaintiff to obtain a non-conforming use ex-
emption. However, the Court recognized an exception to the
general rule when "substantial construction has been made on
the property or substantial expenses incurred relating directly
to the construction prior to the ordinance." '77 To apply this
exception to a particular fact pattern the Court must decide
whether the interest in the utilization of the property has be-
come "vested" in the owner. 78 The facts in Perkins, concluded
the Court, showed that the plaintiff's interest in the use of the
land for apartments and a trailer court had become vested
because he had incurred substantial expense. Therefore the
' Id. at 167.
"s Id. at 168.
174 Id.
17 Id.
"I Id. The Court of Appeals cites Darlington v. Board of Councilmen, 140 S.W.2d
392 (Ky. 1940); Appeal of Sandey, 85 A.2d 28 (Pa. 1951); Amereihn v. Kotras, 71 A.2d
865 (Md. 1950); and 2 E. C. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRAcrIcE § 16-4 (3d ed. supp.
1977), for guidelines as to whether an interest has become "vested".
An interesting question follows from the vested rights approach to non-conforming
uses: Can the local government be held liable for damages incurred by a property
owner where the local government incorrectly attempts to prevent completion of the
construction of the non-conforming use? See Allen v. City and County of Honolulu,
571 P.2d 328 (Hawaii, 1977) (holding that it cannot).
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Court applied the exception to the general rule and allowed the
plaintiff to maintain his non-conforming use. '79
B. Amortization and Forfeiture
The final question confronted by the Court of Appeals in
dealing with the regulation-of non-conforming uses concerned
the enforceability of amortization ordinances which mandate
cessation of certain non-conforming uses by a specified date.8 0
Professor Tarlock's view that KRS § 100.253 precluded the use
of amortization ordinances by local legislatures 8' was adopted
by the Court of Appeals in City of Paducah v. Johnson.'2 The
Paducah ordinance involved required the elimination of non-
conforming junkyards within two years of the date of enact-
ment. 8 3 The Court found the ordinance invalid due to the fail-
ure of the Kentucky Legislature to provide for amortization
ordinances in section 100.253.'1
In City of Middlesboro Planning Commission v. Howard, '5
the Kentucky Supreme Court took a similar position regarding
forfeiture clauses in local non-conforming use ordinances. In
Howard, the Middlesboro ordinance required businesses en-
gaged in non-conforming uses to obtain a privilege license. Fur-
ther, the ordinance provided that failure to obtain the privilege
license revoked the non-conforming use and required the pay-
ment of a fine.1m The Court upheld the privilege license re-
quirement as a legitimate revenue producing ordinance. The
forfeiture provision was held invalid, however, because the
owner retained vested property rights except by abandon-
ment.'87 Therefore, after City of Paducah v. Johnson and City
' 480 S.W.2d at 168.
" Tarlock, supra note 3, at 605. Most courts consider amortization provisions
valid. Kratovil, Zoning: A New Look, 11 CREIGHTON L. REv. 433, 448 (1977).
"I Tarlock, supra note 3, at 605.
In 522 S.W.2d 447 (Ky. 1975).
In Id. at 448.
," Id. The Court of Appeals declined to decide the issue on constitutional grounds.
Id.
Some planning units still have amortization provisions. See, e.g., CITY OF LEBA-
NON, Ky., ZONING ORDINANCE art. 1H, § C (4) (1972); Crr OF MADISONVILLE, Ky., ZONING
REGULATIONS § (B) (5) (1970).
"n 551 S.W.2d 556 (Ky. 1977).
In Id.
"I Id. at 557.
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of Middlesboro Planning Commission v. Howard, a local ordi-
nance may terminate a non-conforming use only after it has
been intentionally'abandoned.
V. VARIANCES AND CONDITIONAL USES
The statutory power allowing boards of adjustment to
grant variances and conditional use permits ' has been judi-
cially refined by two cases involving judicial review of board of
adjustment decisions. In the first case, Menefee v. Board of
Adjustment, ," the Court of Appeals examined the scope of ju-
dicial review in appeals from board of adjustment decisions.
The Court found that this type of review was limited by para-
meters nearly identical to those placed on judicial review in
appeals from planning commission and local legislative deci-
sions. '9
In Menefee, the appellees had petitioned the local board
of adjustment to grant a variance permitting construction of a
house facing a direction other than that required by the zoning
ordinance. Compliance with the ordinance, they claimed,
would require them to build on top of a sinkhole."' The board
granted the variance, and local landowners appealed to the
circuit court, contending that the grant of the variance was
arbitrary and not supported by substantial evidence."2 The
Court of Appeals examined the findings of the board of adjust-
ment and upheld the circuit court's determination that the
board of adjustment was justified in granting the variance pur-
suant to the power granted to the board by KRS § § 100.241 and
100.243."1 In upholding the variance, the Court adopted a very
deferential posture toward findings by the board of adjust-
ment. Although this deference was not expressly noted in the
Court's opinion, the willingness of the Court to uphold the
findings of the board of adjustment indicates that the Court
In See text accompanying notes 26 to 29 supra for a discussion of the duty of the
board of adjustment.
In 494 S.W.2d 519 (Ky. 1973).
I" The limits on judicial review from planning commission and local legislative
decisions are set out in City of Louisville v. Kavanaugh, 494 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1973)
and are discussed in the text accompanying notes 107 to 119 supra.
I 494 S.W.2d at 519-20.
" Id. at 520.
" Id. at 521.
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was engaging in only limited judicial review, as it had in
Kavanaugh and Taylor v. Coblin.11' Thus the Court practiced
in Menefee what it had preached in Kavanaugh and Coblin,
implying a close parallel between the scope of substantive judi-
cial review in appeals from the board of adjustment and in
appeals from rezoning decisions of the planning commission
and local legislature.
In the second case in this area, Carlton v. Taylor,"5 the
Court attempted to refine the definition of "conditional use."
In Carlton, the board of adjustment was permitted by ordi-
nance to allow conditional uses in four situations, the fourth of
which was a very broad, standardless category. An unsuccess-
ful applicant for a conditional use permit argued that the pro-
vision was unconstitutional and that therefore the city should
permit the requested use, a liquor store.' 9 The Court of Ap-
peals agreed that the fourth category was unconstitutional, due
to the absence of reasonable standards to guide the board in
exercising its discretion. Nevertheless, the Court refused to
order that the use be granted, since the liquor store did not fall
within the other three categories of permissible conditional
uses. The first three categories were not invalidated by the
unconstitutionality of the fourth. ' Furthermore, the Court
found that the board of adjustment did not act arbitrarily"'8 in
confining itself to the first three categories of permissible con-
ditional uses, since the term "conditional use" is statutorily
defined as "a use which is essential to or would promote the
public health, safety, or welfare. . .," but which, nevertheless,
should be subject to some restrictions within a zone. 9' Accord-
ing to the Court, this definition simply indicated a policy of
"attempting to permit such uses as schools, fire, and police
stations, and other essential service type uses. .. ."I There-
MU 461 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1970). See text accompanying notes 103 to 106 supra for a
discussion of Taylor v. Coblin.
The granting of variances is generally considered to be quasi-judicial in character,
as is rezoning. 1 P. ROHAN, supra note 167, at § 1.02(5) (1978).
'' 569 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
,,, Id. at 680.
19 Id.
,, Id. at 681.
,, KRS § 100.111(5) (1978 Supp.).
2w Carlton v. Taylor, 569 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
[Vol. 67
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
fore, a liquor store could not be considered a conditional use
under any ordinance."'
The Carlton Court seems to have given an unduly restric-
tive meaning to the term, "conditional use." It is unlikely that
the Legislature intended to restrict conditional uses to the area
of essential services. Certainly, local governments have not so
construed the provision. Most ordinances list conditional uses
which go far beyond essential services, including such uses as
country clubs,02 real estate sales offices, 203 community ga-
rages, 2'4 car washes," 5 advertising signs,"' and race tracks.2
These uses are hardly more "essential" than a liquor store, yet
they are not rarities in ordinances of most communities. There-
fore, the effect of Carlton v. Taylor is likely to be quite pro-
found, since many zoning ordinances contravene its ruling that
only essential services may be considered conditional uses.
VI. SUBDIVISION REGULATION
A. The Definition of Subdivision
Section 100.273 authorizes planning commissions to adopt
regulations for the subdivision of land. 5 As amended in 1974,
section 100.111(2) defines "subdivision" in this way:
"Subdivision" means the division of a parcel of land into
three (3) or more lots or parcels except in a county containing
a city of the first, second or third class or in an urban county
government where a subdivision means the division of a par-
cel of land into two (2) or more lots or parcels for the purpose,
whether immediate or future, of sale, lease, or building devel-
opment, or if a new street is involved, any division of a parcel
of land: Providing That a division of land for agricultural
2 Id.
22 E.g., LEXINGTON-FAYETrr URBAN COUNTY, Ky., ZONING ORDINANCE § 7.13 (1975).
"I E.g., Id.; BEREA, Ky., ZONING ORDINANCE § 8.3 (1971).
2$ E.g., LEXINGTON-FAYETrE URBAN COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE § 7.19 (1975).
28 E.g., Id. at § 7.23.
2" E.g., GEORGrOWN-ScorT COUNTY, Ky., ZONING ORDINANCE § 4.41 (1971);
ZONING ORDINANCE FR BOYLE COUNTY, Ky. § 432.2 (1975).
2 E.g., LEXINGTON-FAYETrE URBAN COUNTY, Ky., ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 7.25, 7.27
(1975).
20 See Tarlock, supra note 3, at 613-19, for a discussion of subdivision regulation.
For a discussion of the rationale underlying subdivision regulation, see 1 P. RoHAN,
supra note 167, at § 1.02(6).
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purposes into lots or parcels of five (5) acres, or more and not
involving a new street shall not be deemed a subdivision.
Critics have pointed out that this definition causes difficulties
in administration. ' McCord v. Pineway Farms210 helps to re-
solve at least one of these difficulties; the uncertain scope of the
agricultural exemption. This difficulty results from the ab-
sence of a definition for "agricultural purpose" in chapter
100.211 In McCord, the defendant submitted a plat for the divi-
sion of a 140 acre tract of land to the county clerk's office.
According to the plat, the defendant intended to create seven-
teen five to six acre tracts and one larger tract, each with its
own driveway.212 A citizens group petitioned the circuit court
for a declaration of rights, contending that the subdivision was
not for agricultural purposes and was therefore subject to local
subdivision regulations.2 13 The circuit court, in granting sum-
mary judgment, ruled that the determination of what consti-
tuted an agricultural purpose was a legislative rather than a
judicial function and denied declaratory relief. The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that summary judgment was impro-
per because there were genuine issues of fact and that it was
error not to provide a meaningful definition of "agricultural
purposes. '21 4 The Court of Appeals noted that the purpose of
the agricultural exception to subdivision regulations was "to
exempt the legitimate farmer who divides part of his farm real
estate among the members of his family."21 5 Therefore, the
court remanded the case for a full hearing to determine the
merits of plaintiffs contention that Pineway Farms intended
to create "a high priced residential subdivision" by using the
agricultural purpose exemption as a zoning loophole. 216
Pineway Farms makes clear that the intent of the subdivi-
der is the proper focus for determining whether the agricultural
219 Kentucky Local Planning Laws: Legislative Research Commission Research
Report No. 134 (1977); Tarlock, supra note 3, at 613.
210 569 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
"I Kentucky Local Planning Laws: Legislative Research Commission Research
Report No. 134 (1977).
21 569 S.W.2d at 691.
213 Id.
21 Id. at 692.
215 Id.
21, Id. at 693.
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exemption applies. The key question of intent is whether the
subdivider has agricultural interests in mind for the land.
21 7
Nevertheless, it is improbable that Pineway Farms represents
the end of litigation in this area, since the courts must yet
determine the extent and nature of the agricultural interest
necessary to qualify for the agricultural exemption.
B. Subdivision Regulation and Due Process
Section 100.277 authorizes the planning commission to
approve subdivision plans, or "plats", prior to their recordation
by the county clerk. The scope of the authority of the planning
commission to approve plats, in light of due process and statu-
tory requirements, was at issue in Snyder v. Owensboro. 2
11
According to the Court, planning commission authority in
the area of plat approval is subject to three restrictions. First,
due process requires the planning commission to base its deci-
sion on the subdivision regulations.21' Second, due process re-
quires the planning commission to state the reasons for its
decision in clear and concise terms.Y' Third, the planning com-
mission has the statutory duty to adopt subdivision regulations
that contain "specific standards. . . rather than mere broad
generalizations with regard to health, safety, morals and gen-
eral welfare, or the use of such flexible terms as 'most advanta-
geous development.' "221 The Court concluded, the approval of
subdivision plats is a ministerial act, rather than one requiring
discretion on the part of the commission .122 Thus, any disap-
proval of a subdivision plat must be based exclusively on fail-
ure to meet an explicit requirement of the subdivision regula-
tions. The Court held that the Owensboro planning commis-
sion had acted outside the scope of its authority, because the
reason for rejection was not a subdivision regulation, but a
requirement uniquely imposed on a particular plat.2
227 Id. at 692-93.
211 528 S.W.2d 663 (Ky. 1975).
'" Id. at 664.
nId.
22" Id. The Court based this requirement on KRS § 100.281 (1971).
2n Id. The Court supported this conclusion with the provision in KRS § 100.281
(1971) that this duty may be delegated, and the common-law rule that only ministerial
duties may be delegated. Id. at 664-65.
2" Id. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the planning commission asserted addi-
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VII. NON-EUCLIDEAN ZONING
A. The Floating Zone
Local ordinances occasionally attempt zoning that does
not utilize traditional "Euclidean" techniques-that is, tech-
niques which rely on grid patterns of height, bulk and setback
requirements"' and districts with specific locations. One non-
Euclidean technique is the use of the "floating zone."21 A float-
ing zone is a special use district with no specifically-assigned
location,2 but which is compatible with a number of areas in
which the local legislature has determined the zone may be
located. 27 The local legislature creating the floating zone may
either retain authority to thereafter locate the use district or
delegate the authority to an administrative body such as a
planning commission.22 A landowner seeking the use permitted
by the floating zone may initiate proceedings to locate the
zone.Y'
The validity of floating zones has been challenged in the
courts,2so usually on the basis of the statutory requirement that
zoning ordinances be enacted in accordance with the com-
munity's comprehensive plan.21 The Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals was faced with a challenge to the floating zone concept
when the validity of one of Paducah's floating zones was ques-
tioned in Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle.22 In Priddle, a Paducah
ordinance created a floating zone permitting a motel use and
delegated to the planning commission the authority to locate
tional reason for the rejection of the plat. The Court of Appeals refused to consider
these reasons because, the Court stated, due process requires the stating of the reasons
at the time disapproval was made. Id. at 665.
2 Tarlock, supra note 3, at 598.
21 Kratovil, Zoning a New Look, 11 CREIGirON L. REv. 433, 458 (1977). See Reno,
Non-Euclidean Zoning: The Use of the Floating Zone, 23 MD. L. Rav. 105 (1963), for
a discussion of the distinction between Euclidean and non-Euclidean zoning.
21 Id.; 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 167, at § 13.01(1).
2" Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle, 503 S.W.2d 734, 740 (Ky. 1974).
2n 1 E.C. YOKLEY, supra note 2, at 233.
2" Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle, 503 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Ky. 1974).
2 Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 95, 99 (1977).
2' 1 E.C. YOKLEY, supra note 2, at 233.
=2 503 S.W.2d 734 (Ky. 1974).
Other local governments provide for floating zones. E.g., BOWLING GREEN, KY.,
CODE app. A. § 17.5 (1977); EUiZABETHTOWN, Ky., ZONING ORDINANCE art. VIII (1973);
HENDERSON, KY., ZONING CODE § 150.22 (1975).
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the zone.2 Neighboring landowners sought to maintain an in-
junction granted by the circuit court against developers intend-
ing to construct a motel and against the Paducah Planning and
Zoning Commission to prevent further consideration of the
application to settle the floating zone.24 The neighboring land-
owners first contended that the floating zone was invalid be-
cause the city ordinance creating the floating zone did not com-
ply with KRS § 100.183, which requires ordinances to be en-
acted in accordance with the comprehensive plan."' The Court
rejected this argument, noting that other jurisdictions have
likewise upheld floating zones against such arguments, and
that the comprehensive plan should be used as a flexible guide
rather than a "straitjacket."'' =
Second, the plaintiffs contended that authorizing the
planning commission to settle the zone constituted an illegal
delegation of legislative authority. The Court of Appeals dis-
agreed, holding that such delegation was necessary and proper
to the implementation of the local legislative goal of providing
a more flexible procedure for settling floating zones.218
Third, the plaintiffs argued that the floating zone was, in
effect, an illegal variance, since KRS § 100.247 grants the
board of adjustment exclusive authority to allow variances. 23'
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument because the float-
ing zone, unlike a variance, had been deemed by the local
legislature to be compatible with the location in advance of any
individual application for the permitted use.240 Finally, the
landowners contended that the floating zone ordinance was
void for lack of standards. 241 Again the Court of Appeals dis-
agreed, finding that the zoning ordinance did, in fact, contain
2 503 S.W.2d at 738.
214 Id. at 735-36.
21 Id. at 738.
2 Id. Some jurisdictions have taken a narrower view of the comprehensive plan
and decided that a floating zone is invalid under the requirement that regulations be
propounded in accordance with a comprehensive plan. Reno, Non-Euclidean Zoning:
The Use of the Floating Zone, 23 MD. L. REv. 105, 113 (1963).
2" 503 S.W.2d at 739.
"' Id.
23' Id.
2' Id. at 740. For a discussion of the distinction between a floating zone and a
variance, see 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 167, at § 13.04(2)(d).
24 503 S.W.2d at 740.
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very specific standards for the administration of the zone. 42
In addition to attacking the validity of the ordinance cre-
ating floating zones, the landowners in Bellemeade also chal-
lenged the placement of the zone on a specific location. 243 The
Court, however, applied the same standards of judicial review
as it applied in the rezoning cases,7 4 and found that procedural
due process had been satisfied and that the findings were sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 25 The Court, therefore, upheld
not only the floating zone concept, but its application in
Bellemeade as well.
B. Planned Unit Development
The other major non-Euclidean zoning concept is the
planned unit development, or PUD.20 The planned unit devel-
opment is a type of zoning district distinct from the conven-
tional types of zoning districts in that regulations apply to a
project as a whole rather than to individual lots.4 ' Planned unit
development is appropriate where it is desirable to develop lot
groupings as a unit and apply regulations more flexible than
those pertaining to traditional zoning classifications .2  The
courts in many jurisdictions have sustained the PUD as a valid
type of zoning district,29 and Professor Tarlock has suggested
that KRS chapter 100 appears to permit the PUD zone.25o
The Court in Cetrulo v. City of Park Hills,"' adopted Pro-
fessor Tarlock's viewpoint. In Cetrulo neighboring property
owners challenged a Kenton County planned unit development
involving the construction of a seven-story condominium on a
242 Id.
24 Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 95, 99 (1977).
2" See text accompanying notes 100 to 136 supra for a discussion of this standard
of review.
2" 503 S.W.2d at 740.
246 For a discussion of the distinction between PUD's and floating zones, see 2 P.
ROHAN, supra note 167, at § 13.04(1).
247 1 P. ROHAN, supra note 167, at 239-40.
24 E. C. YOKLEY, supra note 2, at 239-40.
2I Id. at 238.
21 Tarlock, supra note 3, at 598-600, citing KRS § 100.203(1)(e) (Supp. 1978).
Kentucky is one of only seven states which statutorily recognize the planned unit
development. See 2 P. RoHAN, supra note 167, at § 13.04(1)n.8.
1 524 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. 1975).
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seven and one-half acre tract of land.2 2 The Kentucky Court
of Appeals upheld both the Kenton County ordinance authoriz-
ing PUD's and its application in the case. The use of PUD's was
viewed as a natural outgrowth of the flexible zoning techniques
approved in Bellemeade.2 =3 The application in this case was
proper because the local legislature had amended the zoning
ordinance to allow PUD's in any district zoned in the same
class as the piece of property in question. Because this amend-
ment to the text of the ordinance was legislative action rather
than an adjudicatory proceeding such as a map amendment
decision, the failure to comply with the requirements of City
of Louisville v. McDonald24 was of no consequence.
Cetrulo and Bellemeade, therefore, show a favorable atti-
tude on the part of Kentucky's appellate courts to innovative
and flexible zoning techniques. These cases also demonstrate
that the Court will construe the language of KRS chapter 100
broadly enough to allow for zoning methods which were not
specifically contemplated by the legislature at the time of en-
actment of the statute.
CONCLUSION
In preparation for the 1978 session of the Kentucky Gen-
eral Assembly, the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission
called for the Legislature to authorize a study which would
culminate in the complete revision of KRS chapter 100.21 The
Commission felt that such drastic action was necessary be-
cause of numerous ambiguities and inadequacies existing in
chapter 100.21 These unresolved problems with chapter 100
are, however, due largely to the inactivity of recent General
Assemblies in zoning matters. In contrast to this legislative
inertia, Kentucky courts have been remarkably active in zon-
11 Id. Other local ordinances provide for planned unit developments. E.g.,
HAZARD, Ky., ZONING ORDINANCE (REv.) § 44 (1967); RICHMoND, Ky., ZONING ORDINANCE
§§ 700-710 (1978); ELZABEHTrOWN, Ky., ZONING ORDINANCE art. VII (1973); LEXINGTON-
FAYErrF URBAN COUNTY, Ky., ZONING ORDINANCE art. 13 (1975); GEORGETOWN-ScoTr
COUNTY, KY., ZONING ORDINANCE § 2.32 (1971).
2 Cetrulo v. City of Park Hills, 524 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Ky. 1975).
2" 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971).
2m Kentucky Local Planning Laws: Kentucky Legislative Research Commission
Report No. 134, at 52 (1977).
"I Id. at 51.
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ing matters to compensate for the inadequacies of chapter 100.
In so doing, the courts have provided: (1) procedural protection
for both the rights of property owners and the public in rezon-
ing matters, (2) an active but limited judicial role in the review
of local zoning decisions, (3) a foundation for innovative and
flexible zoning techniques that were not contemplated by the
original zoning statute, and (4) numerous interpretations and
clarifications of the sometimes unclear language of the zoning
statute. The need for courts to provide such protection, review,
innovation and clarification will remain at an elevated level as
long as legislators remain lethargic and relatively uninvolved
in the area of zoning.
